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I. INTRODUCTION
It is a well-established common law rule that a stranger generally owes
no duty to assist or rescue another, or to take active steps for their protec-
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tion, safety, or welfare.1 Of course, as one might expect, there are exceptions to this general rule.2 An often-acknowledged situation in which the
common law is willing to deviate from this established principle is when
there is a pre-existing relationship between the parties.3 The Second Restatement of Torts gives a non-exhaustive list of examples of “special relations” that give rise to a duty to protect another from harm, including innkeeper-guest, business invitor-invitee, custodian-person in custody, and
carrier-passenger.4 The most relevant of these relationships to the forthcoming analysis is the one that is recognized between a common carrier and its
passengers.5
A common carrier can be defined as one “whose occupation is transportation of persons or things from place to place for hire or reward,”6 and
some common examples of these would include busses, airplanes, taxis,
and commuter trains.7 Illinois courts have adopted the well-recognized
principle that the duty of the common carrier, which arises out of this common law special relationship, is “the highest duty of care consistent with the
practical operation of [the carrier’s] conveyances.”8 In addition, the status
of being a common carrier prescribes an even more specific duty, the duty
to provide a safe place to “alight,” 9 meaning to “dismount” or “descend”
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (“The fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not
of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.”); MICHAEL A. MENLOWE &
ALEXANDER MCCALL SMITH, THE DUTY TO RESCUE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 5 (1993)
(“[I]n the law in English-speaking common law countries there is no general duty to rescue.”). See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 345-46 (Pa. 1959) (finding that the defendant had no duty to assist the plaintiff who drowned in a water-filled coal trench, even
though the defendant had dared him to jump into it).
2. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321-23 (1965). There is a
generally recognized common law duty to assist a stranger in situations, such as, but not
limited to, when one tortuously or innocently causes harm to another, if one has created an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, or if one voluntarily undertakes to render services to
another. Id.
3. MENLOWE, supra note 1, at 63 (“This category provides the clearest instances of
a legally recognized duty to rescue in common law systems.”).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
5. Id.
6.
Cushing v. White, 172 P. 229, 232 (Wash. 1918).
7. See generally Stupka v. People’s Cab Co., 264 A.2d 373 (Pa. 1970); Gegere v.
Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 220 N.W. 429 (Minn. 1928); Sheffer v. Springfield Airport Auth., 632
N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Jones v. Chi. Transit Auth., 565 N.E.2d 46 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990).
8.
Sheffer, 632 N.E.2d at 1071.
9.
Penn. Co. v. McCaffrey, 50 N.E. 713, 714 (Ill. 1898).
This relation between a passenger and a railroad company does not cease
upon the arrival of a train at the place of the passenger's destination, but
the company is still bound to furnish him an opportunity to safely alight
from the train. It is its duty not only to exercise a high degree of care
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from something; in this case a vehicle.10 So, not only must the providers of
air, ground, and rail transportation carry their passengers safely to their
destinations, but they must also provide them with a reasonable opportunity
to leave the conveyance safely.11
Another important and generally recognized legal principle is what is
commonly known as the “Massachusetts rule,”12 or as it has come to be
referred to in Illinois, the “natural accumulation rule.”13 In direct contrast
with the duty of common carriers, instead of prescribing duties that must be
followed, this rule specifies situations in which no duty is owed and therefore no action need be taken.14 Under this rule, “the owner of [a] premises
is under no duty to remove a natural accumulation of ice and snow even
though he is or should be aware that the accumulation itself is hazardous.”15
These two legal doctrines came into direct conflict in the Illinois Supreme Court case of Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority, which involved a
woman who slipped and fell on an icy Chicago El platform and broke her
ankle.16 The holding of this case established a precedent in Illinois tort law
that allows the natural accumulation rule to override the duties of a common carrier to its passengers, more specifically, the duty of providing passengers with a safe place to alight.17
To fully understand the impact of Kyrwin,18 imagine a situation where
a young man named Paul Passenger is riding the Chicago El home from
work one January evening. He has been a Chicago native all of his life and
has relied on the public transportation that the city provides for as long as
he can remember. It has been snowing and sleeting off and on for the past
three days, but at the present time there is no precipitation. The train pulls
into his stop, and he prepares to exit. The El platform has some areas that
are covered by awnings, and some that are not. In the areas not covered by

Id.

while the passenger is upon the train, but also to use the highest degree
of care and skill, reasonably practicable, in providing the passenger a
safe passage from the train.

10. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 34 (3d ed. 1994).
11. See, e.g., Chi. Terminal Transfer R.R. Co. v. Schmelling, 64 N.E. 714, 717 (Ill.
1902); Chi. & E. Ill. R.R. Co. v. Jennings, 60 N.E. 818, 820 (Ill. 1901); McCaffrey, 50 N.E.
at 714.
12.
Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Mass. 2010).
13.
Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ill. 2010).
14. Michael J. Polelle, Is the Natural Accumulation Rule All Wet?, 26 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 631, 649 (1994-1995) (“If taken seriously, the rule favors inaction over action.”).
15.
Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys. Inc., 418 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
16. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 440.
17. Id. at 452-53 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“The court today holds that the natural
accumulation rule relieves common carriers of the duty to provide passengers a safe place to
alight.”).
18. 938 N.E.2d 440.
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awnings the floor of the platform is covered by a layer of partially melted
snow, underneath which is a thin layer of ice. The city employs a worker
named Shane Shovel who is in charge of maintaining several El stations
throughout the city. He is currently at this particular El station, but due to
his large workload he has not been able to clear most of the ice and snow
from the platform. When the train stops, there are accessible exit doors
leading both to areas where the floor is covered in ice and snow and to
areas where it is clear. There are no signs posted and no verbal warning is
given by the conductor advising of the slippery conditions. As Paul attempts to exit the crowded El car, he steps into an area that is not clear of
slush and ice. He loses his footing and lands on his tailbone and arm. As a
result, he suffers several serious broken bones.
He has minimal health insurance coverage through his job, but the extensive medical treatment, which includes surgery and months of physical
therapy, result in excessive charges that are more than he could ever hope to
pay. To make matters worse, he is temporarily confined to a wheelchair
because of his injury, and therefore he cannot perform the duties required of
him at his job. As a result, he is fired. With mounting medical bills and no
means to pay them, he turns to a local attorney for some assistance. After
hearing his story, the attorney explains to him that because of the Illinois
Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Krywin19 he has no recourse against the
city.
This Note will address four main issues arising out of the Krywin decision. First, it will consider whether it is a divergence from common law
precedent set both by Illinois courts and other courts throughout the nation
that have dealt with similar issues. Second, it will examine the Krywin
court’s reliance on the “known or obvious dangers” doctrine20 as a means of
justifying its holding, and whether this reliance is a sound legal argument.
Third, this Note will consider if the decision in this case is in conflict with
the statutory language and the legislative intent of Illinois’ Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.21 Finally, it will
address the concerns created for future accident victims in Illinois that will
have no recourse or remedy because of the decision in Krywin, and whether
the reasoning used by the Court justifies the fact that these concerns will
now be ignored.
In Part II, this Note will look at the historical development of both the
duty of common carriers and the natural accumulation rule, starting with
their inception and development throughout the country as a whole, and
19.
20.

Id.
Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 454-55 (Freeman, J., dissenting); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965).
21. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (2008).
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then focusing on the role that they have played in the shaping of Illinois
common law. Next, Part III will summarize Krywin v. Chicago Transit Authority22 and gives a brief outline of the important facts, legal arguments
and holdings of the case. Next, Part IV will consider the reasoning and
analysis offered by both the majority and the dissent, and then discusses the
merits of the Court’s final holding. Finally, Part V will consider the impact
of the Krywin decision on tort litigation in Illinois and the various problems
for future plaintiffs that the decision has created.
This Note argues that the reasoning the majority in Krywin used to
come to its conclusion was flawed. The Court ignored past precedent and
the intent of the legislature, and as a result Illinois remains one of a small
minority of states23 still clinging to the archaic idea of the natural accumulation rule which offers an exemption from a duty where it is obvious that a
duty should be imposed. This ruling gives too much weight to the “unreasonable burden”24 placed on municipalities to deal with the problem of naturally occurring hazards, while ignoring the plight of its citizens who could
be injured through no fault of their own and have no recourse for compensation.
II.THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATION LEADING UP TO
KRYWIN
A.

THE DUTY OF COMMON CARRIERS

A general characteristic that all common carriers share is their accessibility to the public.25 Another is that they generally perform their services in
exchange for compensation.26 Some jurisdictions also have an additional
requirement that, in order to be classified as a common carrier, a business
22. 938 N.E.2d 440.
23. See Polelle, supra note 14, at 648 n.98 (“Only seven states, Illinois, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, and Ohio, apply the natural accumulation
rule in all types of cases.”); see also Papadopoulos, 930 N.E.2d at 156. In the summer of
2010, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts unanimously rejected the “Massachusetts rule,” which is the equivalent of the natural accumulation rule, bringing the number of
states that now apply the rule in all types of cases from seven to six. Id.
24. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 451.
25. See Lazor v. Banas, 174 A. 817, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1934) (“[W]e have uniformly held that the test of a common carrier is one who undertakes to carry for hire all
persons indifferently who apply for it.”); Merch. Parcel Delivery v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
28 A.2d 340, 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942) (“[T]he definitions found in the cases stress the allimportant factor that a common carrier is one that holds itself out and undertakes to carry the
goods of all persons indifferently, or of all who choose to employ it, and one that invites the
custom of the public indiscriminately.”).
26. See Cushing, 172 P. at 232.
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must be regulated, or subject to governmental supervision via a license or
permit.27
Common carriers are regarded by the common law as having a “special relation” with their passengers (much like a business invitor has to an
invitee) which gives rise to a duty to take reasonable action to aid or protect
them.28 The responsibilities, however, do not end there.29 Starting as early
as the 1850’s, with the case of Sprague v. Smith,30courts around the nation
have held that common carriers owe a higher degree of care to their passengers than just reasonableness.31 One explanation that has been offered for
this is that the relationship between carrier and passenger is a contractual
one.32 The contract can be interpreted as being implied or as being in fact,
with the offer and acceptance being “the carrier promising, so far as within
its control, safe passage, in return for the payment of the fare by the passenger.”33 Another explanation is that usually the activities of a common carrier in some way serve the public, and therefore imposition of additional legal duties is justified.34 This idea goes hand-in-hand with the aforementioned generally shared trait of common carriers that they are usually operating under licenses or permits and therefore indirectly subject to governmental supervision.35
27.
A. Bob Jordan, Negligence: Ski Lifts-Common Carriers-Highest Degree of
Care, 1 WASHBURN L.J. 316, 317 (1960-1962). See, e.g., Indianapolis Traction & Terminal
Co. v. Lawson, 143 F. 834, 837 (7th Cir. 1906); Lazor, 174 A. at 819.
28. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
29. See Jordan, supra note 27, at 316 (“[A] different degree of care is, in the absence of statutory modification, required of common carriers . . . toward their patrons than is
required of other business ventures.”).
30.
29 Vt. 421 (1857) (“[Common carriers must] exercise the utmost care that no
injury befall those who entrust themselves to their custody.”) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Retkowski v. Balt. Transit Co., 160 A.2d 791, 795 (Md. 1960)
(“[C]ommon carriers of passengers . . . are bound to exercise the highest degree of care
which is consistent with the nature of their undertaking.”) (emphasis added); Simpson v.
Gray Line Co., 358 P.2d 516, 518 (Or. 1961) (“The jury was correctly instructed in the case
at bar that a common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree of care and skill practicable for it to exercise.”) (emphasis added).
32.
Bowen v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 136 F. 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1905).
The relation between carrier and passenger in the first place is contractual. From the moment the passenger comes to purchase his ticket and
enters the train to the end of his journey he passes measurably under the
control and direction of the agents and servants of the carrier, upon
whom the law imposes the correlative duty of protecting him against insults, assaults, and injuries perpetrated by them, or others on the train, in
so far as they can reasonably do so.
Id.
33. Jordan, supra note 27, at 317.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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Whatever reason is given in various jurisdictions for applying this requirement of a heightened degree of care over mere reasonableness, the
underlying reasoning that they all share is they are all related to “public
convenience and necessity requiring safe passage.”36 The reason that Illinois courts have generally used to explain this is that it is “due to the unique
control [a common carrier] possesses over its passengers' safety.”37 Accordingly, this reasoning and this standard of care were also mentioned in the
Krywin case.38
B.

THE COMMON CARRIER’S DUTY TO PROVIDE A SAFE PLACE TO ALIGHT

To “alight” means “to dismount from a horse, descend from a vehicle,
etc.” or “to settle or stay after descending.”39 Most courts have assigned a
duty to common carriers to provide their passengers with a safe place to
alight as part of the aforementioned pre-existing duty to provide the highest
degree of care.40 Early cases that dealt with the coupling of these two ideas
focused on railroad cars and their passengers41 (as does the present-day
Krywin case).42 As time progressed, and modern technology advanced,
courts began to affirm that this duty extended to all types of common carriers, including busses,43 airplanes, and boats.44
36. Id. at 318.
37. Sheffer v. Springfield Airport Auth., 632 N.E.2d 1069, 1071 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994). See, e.g., Rotheli v. Chi. Transit Auth., 130 N.E.2d 172, 175 (Ill. 1955); Jones v. Chi.
& Nw. Transp. Co., 563 N.E.2d 1120, 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Shoemaker v. RushPresbyterian-St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., 543 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Serritos v.
Chi. Transit Auth., 505 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
38. Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ill. 2010) (“[D]ue to the
unique control a common carrier has over its passengers' safety, it owes those passengers the
highest duty of care consistent with the practical operation of its conveyances.”).
39. Alight
Definition,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/alight (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
40. See, e.g., Katamay v. Chi. Transit Auth., 289 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ill. 1972) (holding that the heightened duty that is applied to common carriers “does not terminate until the
passenger has alighted from the train and left the place where passengers are discharged
. . . .”); Fagan v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 115 N.E. 704, 707 (N.Y. 1917) (“The relation of
passenger and carrier does not, under ordinary conditions, terminate until the passenger has
had a reasonable opportunity to safely alight and pass from the station premises of the carrier.”).
41. See, e.g., Penn. Co. v. McCaffrey, 50 N.E. 713, 714 (Ill. 1898); McDonald v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 55 N.W. 102 (Iowa 1893); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co. v. Hodgson, 31 P.
954 (Colo. 1892).
42. See Krywin, 938 N.E.2d 440.
43. See, e.g., Parker v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 323 P.2d 108, 112 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (holding in an action involving the plaintiff’s injury while exiting a bus “that the duty
ends when the passenger is discharged into a relatively safe space, not merely that he alights
safely from the bus if he is discharged into a dangerous area”).
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This reasoning was adopted by the Illinois courts as well, starting with
the general safety concern regarding train passengers at the time of the industrial revolution,45 and then later becoming more inclusive as more modes of mass transportation developed over time.46 The Court in Krywin acknowledged that this duty still existed,47 but decided, however, that this
widely acknowledged and time-tested obligation was overruled in situations
where the natural accumulation rule took effect.48
C.

THE NATURAL ACCUMULATION RULE’S DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE
COMMON LAW

It is probably no coincidence that the natural accumulation rule finds
its origins in Massachusetts,49 a state that is like Illinois in that it is subjected to yearly assaults by Mother Nature of snow, ice, sleet, and freezing
rain. The concept first appeared in the context of the lessor-lessee dynamic
in the nineteenth century Massachusetts Supreme Court case, Woods v.
Naumkaeg Steam Cotton Co.50 The court in that case held that “there was
no duty on the part of the [landlord] to the [tenant] to remove from the steps
the ice and snow which naturally accumulated thereon.”51 This rationale
was then later extended to not only include the landlord-tenant relationship,
but the relationship between a municipality and its citizens as well.52 Then
it was further expanded to include the invitor-invitee relationship.53 What
came to be known commonly throughout most of the legal community as

44. See, e.g., Stewart v. Loughman, 80 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. 1951) (In a case involving an injury to a passenger by a propeller while exiting an airplane the court held that the
duty of providing a safe place to alight extended to all “land or water carrier for hire . . . .”).
45. See, e.g., Chi. Terminal Transfer R.R. Co. v. Schmelling, 64 N.E. 714 (Ill.
1902); McCaffrey, 50 N.E. at 715 (“In leaving the train, the passenger has a right to assume
that the company will not expose him to any danger which by the exercise of due care can be
avoided, and that the company has done its duty in the matter of providing him safe landing.”).
46. See, e.g., Sheffer v. Springfield Airport Auth., 632 N.E.2d 1069 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994). Although the verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal, the court still found that
the duty of common carriers to provide a safe place to alight applied to the situation where a
passenger is exiting an airplane onto a tarmac. Id.
47. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 447 (“Thus, the CTA had a duty to provide plaintiff with
a safe place to alight from its train.”).
48. Id. at 450.
49. See Woods v. Naumkaeg Steam Cotton Co., 134 Mass. 357 (1882).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 361.
52. See, e.g., Spillane v. City of Fitchburg, 58 N.E. 176 (Mass. 1900); Reedy v. St.
Louis Brewing Ass’n, 61 S.W. 859 (Mo. 1901).
53. See, e.g., Brandert v. Scottsbluff Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 235 N.W.2d 864, 866
(Neb. 1975); Sherman v. Platte Cnty., 642 P.2d 787, 789 (Wyo. 1982).
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the “Massachusetts rule”54 eventually grew to excuse all landowners, not
just landlords and business invitors, from liability for failing to remove natural accumulations of ice and snow from their property.55

1.

Case Law in Illinois

When this legal doctrine was adopted by the Illinois courts the concepts were the same,56 but they eventually came to be referred to as the
“natural accumulation rule.”57 When the court in Krywin cited the rule to
support its holding the relevant language had evolved in Illinois to say,
“[u]nder the natural accumulation rule, a landowner or possessor of real
property has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice, snow, or water
from its property.”58
However, the adoption of this rule did not leave plaintiffs in Illinois
without recourse.59 There were still two strategies that, if used effectively,
could avoid the natural accumulation rule.60 Plaintiffs could still attempt to
prove that the hazard caused by the ice and snow was artificial and not a
natural accumulation.61 This method proved to be exceedingly difficult,
however, because the various courts throughout the state had differing opinions on what was natural and what was artificial.62 For example, in Strappelli v. City of Chicago,63 the Illinois Supreme Court held that partially
melted snow and ice on public areas that had been subject to foot traffic and
then re-frozen, causing them to be jagged and bumpy with footprints, did
not qualify as unnatural.64 Conversely, in the First Appellate District, the
54.
Papadopoulos v. Target Corp., 930 N.E.2d 142, 145 (Mass. 2010).
55. Id. at 151.
56. See, e.g., Graham v. City of Chi., 178 N.E. 911, 912 (Ill. 1931) (“[A] city is not
liable for injuries resulting from the general slipperiness of its streets and sidewalks due to
the presence of ice and snow which have accumulated as a result of natural causes.”); Erasmus v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 407 N.E.2d 1031, 1033 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (“The property owner,
then, has no duty to remedy a natural accumulation of snow.”).
57. Smalling v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank of Chi., 433 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982).
58.
Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 447 (Ill. 2010).
59. See Polelle, supra note 14, at 632.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See Hankla v. Burger Chef Sys. Inc., 418 N.E.2d 35, 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(“The parties have not cited, nor have we found, an Illinois court which has detailed the
differences between natural and unnatural accumulations.”); Watson v. J.C. Penney Co., 605
N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (Knecht, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one understands the
difference between a natural accumulation of ice and snow, and an unnatural accumulation.”).
63.
20 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. 1939).
64. Id. at 44.
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court held that if a foreign substance becomes part of the mixture of natural
accumulation, then it ceases to be natural and becomes artificial.65 Furthermore, adding to the inconsistency was the decision from the Third District,
which held that chunks of ice or snow that fall from man-made structures,
such as tall buildings, are not unnatural unless they were the result of building defects.66
The second option available to plaintiffs to attempt to get around the
natural accumulation rule was to “show that the landowner voluntarily and
gratuitously undertook to remove the natural accumulation of precipitation
and did so negligently.”67 This, however, was an avenue that Illinois courts
seemed unwilling to take.68 Several decisions in the various appellate courts
throughout the state reinforced the idea that a defendant who attempts to
remove a natural accumulation, but does so negligently (which “arguably
makes the condition more dangerous” than it was to begin with), 69 will not
be held liable for any accidents that consequently occur.70 The common
underlying rationale behind these decisions seems to be that it is a better
policy to encourage land owners to make an attempt at snow removal (regardless of whether it actually makes conditions safer, and even if their
negligence arguably makes conditions more dangerous), rather than to discourage them from doing anything at all for fear of potential liability.71

65. See Swartz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 636 N.E.2d 642, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that an otherwise natural accumulation is artificial when combined with oil and
grease); Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 542 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that an otherwise natural accumulation is artificial when combined with garden soil).
66. Bansch v. Donnelly, 396 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
67. Polelle, supra note 14, at 641.
68. Id. at 645 (“[T]he law is well-established [in Illinois] that a defendant who
removes an overlay of snow but leaves a natural ice formation underneath, cannot be liable
for falls on the ice.”).
69. Polelle, supra note 14, at 645 (“The risk of falling on slick, exposed ice, particularly when there is inadequate lighting, is probably greater than when snow covers the ice
and provides greater traction.”). But see Wells v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 525 N.E.2d
1127, 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (“There is absolutely no evidence in the record to indicate
that the parking lot was more dangerous after it was plowed than before it was plowed and
that allegation will be summarily dismissed.”).
70. See Graf v. St. Luke’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, 625 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993); Webb v. Morgan, 531 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Eichler v. Plitt
Theatres, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 1196, 1201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Wells, 525 N.E.2d at 1131;
Erasmus, 407 N.E.2d at 1033; Anderson v. Davis Dev. Corp., 241 N.E.2d 222, 224 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1968).
71. See Riccitelli v. Sternfeld, 109 N.E.2d 921, 922 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (“In one
sense, a dangerous situation is created, but much less dangerous than would be created if no
one undertook to do anything . . . . The general assumption is that the industry displayed by
citizens removing snow after a snowfall is desirable, if not necessary.”); Polelle, supra note
14.
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Needless to say, attempting to use either of these two avoidance strategies
could prove to be quite frustrating, making the natural accumulation rule a
very high hurdle for plaintiffs in Illinois.

2.

The Restatement’s Role in Illinois’ Application of the Natural
Accumulation Rule

Section 343A of the Second Restatement of Torts outlines what it refers to as the “[k]nown or [o]bvious [d]angers” doctrine,72 or, as it has come
to be known in Illinois and other states, the “open and obvious” rule.73 According to the Restatement, a landowner will not be responsible for injuries
which occur to invitees on his or her land if the danger which caused the
injuries was known to the invitees or would have been known or obvious to
a reasonable person.74 An example of the application of this doctrine can be
found in the Massachusetts Supreme Court case of O’Sullivan v. Shaw,75 in
which the court found that the defendants were not liable for injuries sustained to one of their house guests after he dove head-first into the shallow
end of their swimming pool.76 There is, however, an important exception to
this rule. A possessor of land will not escape potential liability if he or she
“should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”77 The
comments for Section 343A offer some examples of when this might occur:
if the invitee gets distracted and therefore momentarily forgets about the
danger,78 or if it would be reasonable for the invitee to confront the danger
The Illinois Supreme Court . . . [has] expressed the policy that the law
should encourage citizens to take the initiative to remove ice and snow,
even if they do so negligently. Therefore, following this policy, it is necessary for the courts to refuse to recognize any duty to remove natural
accumulation hazards in order to encourage these private efforts.
Id. at 646.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965).
73.
Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 229 (Ill. 1990). See, e.g., O’Sullivan v.
Shaw, 726 N.E.2d 951, 954-55 (Mass. 2000); Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational, Inc., 466
N.W.2d 897, 898 (Wis. 1991).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965) (“A possessor of land is not
liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the
land whose danger is known or obvious to them . . . .”).
75. 726 N.E.2d 951.
76. Id. at 954-55 (“Landowners are relieved of the duty to warn of open and obvious dangers on their premises because it is not reasonably foreseeable that a visitor exercising . . . reasonable care for his own safety would suffer injury from such blatant hazards.”).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965).
Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect
that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover
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because “the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk.”79
Another important caveat to this rule is that owners of public land or of
public utilities will be scrutinized even more than private land owners with
regard to the anticipation of potential harms from open and obvious dangers.80
The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the rationale behind Section 343A
of the Restatement in the case of Ward v. K Mart Corporation,81 which
involved a customer who ran into a large concrete post on his way out to
the parking lot while carrying a large mirror he had just purchased.82 The
court found that K-Mart was still liable for the plaintiff’s injuries despite
the open and obvious nature of the concrete pole.83 In fact, K-Mart had a
duty to protect the customer from the dangerous condition the post caused,
taking into consideration the burden this placed on the defendant, weighed
against the potential for serious harm that may occur.84 Additionally, the
court recognized that defendants in these situations may not be completely
to blame for accidents, and because of the availability of the partial defense
of comparative negligence,85 the plaintiff may be assigned some of the liability.86
The “open and obvious” doctrine is relevant to the discussion of the
natural accumulation rule because the Illinois Supreme Court justified its
holding in Krywin by reaffirming the First District’s argument that requir-

Id.

what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect
himself against it.

79. Id.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(2) (1965) (“In determining whether
the possessor should anticipate harm from a known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of
importance indicating that the harm should be anticipated.”).
81.
554 N.E.2d at 231-32.
82. Id. at 224.
83. Id. at 234.
A rule more consistent with an owner's or occupier's general duty of reasonable care, however, recognizes that the “obviousness” of a condition
or the fact that the injured party may have been in some sense “aware”
of it may not always serve as adequate warning of the condition and of
the consequences of encountering it.
Id. at 230 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (1965)).
84. Id. at 232.
85. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1116 (West 1995). The statute requires that
the damages awarded by the jury be reduced in proportion to the percentage of fault they
assign to the plaintiff. If it is found that the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault however, he or she may recover no damages at all.
86. Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 232 (“If in fact the entrant was also guilty of negligence
contributing to his injury, then that is a proper consideration under comparative negligence
principles.”).
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ing the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) to clear all natural accumulations
of ice and snow in areas where passengers alight from their trains would be
an overwhelming burden.87 Justice Freeman suggested in his dissenting
opinion that by adopting the lower court’s reasoning, the majority held that
placing this burden on the CTA would not be justified because citizens of
Illinois are accustomed to the hazards of snow and ice due to their exposure
to winter weather on a yearly basis, and therefore these are “open and obvious” dangers.88 This reasoning is in direct conflict with the court’s interpretation and application of Section 343A of the Restatement in Ward.89
D.

RELEVANT LEGISLATION IN ILLINOIS

1.

The Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act

The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity essentially protects
the state from any tort claims that its citizens could or would bring against
it.90 The concept that “the King can do no wrong”91 was the law of the land
in Illinois until 1959, when the Illinois Supreme Court effectively abolished
the sovereign immunity doctrine in the case of Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302.92 Moliter involved an injury sustained by a
student while riding a school bus.93 The court held that the school district
could be held liable for the negligence of its employee, the bus driver.94 In
1965, the Illinois legislature responded to this decision by passing the Local
87. Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 451 (Ill. 2010) (“Thus, the appellate court did not err in finding that imposing such a burden on the CTA would be ‘overwhelmingly detrimental to the efficient performance of the transit system.’”) (quoting Krywin v. Chi. Trans. Auth., 909 N.E.2d 887, 893 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)).
88. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 454 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
[T]he holdings are based on the fact that in northern climates, like ours,
where ice and snow are a fact of life, people are aware of the hazards
posed by such conditions, and it is impractical to require property owners and carriers to remove snow and ice . . . In other words, snow and ice
pose dangers that are open and obvious to all who live in climates such
as ours.
Id.
89. See Ward, 554 N.E.2d at 231-32.
90. See, e.g., Kinnare v. City of Chi., 49 N.E. 536 (Ill. 1898); Leviton v. Bd. of
Educ. of City of Chi., 30 N.E.2d 497 (Ill. 1940); Thomas v. Broadlands Cmty. Consol. Sch.
Dist. No. 201, 109 N.E.2d 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953).
91.
Moliter v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ill. 1959)
(citing Russell v. Men of Devon, (1788) 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B.)).
92. 163 N.E.2d 89.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 98.
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Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act95 for the
purposes of providing some protection to local governmental units.96 This
act essentially “codified the natural accumulation rule with respect to municipalities.”97 The Chicago Transit Authority was recognized as a “municipal
corporation for public ownership and operation” when it was created by the
Metropolitan Transit Authority Act in 1945.98 This legislation would seem
to make any tort claim brought against the city to be an open and shut case.
The Illinois General Assembly was careful to avoid this situation however,
because it specifically excluded the CTA and other common carriers from
the protection of the Tort Immunities Act in Section 2-101(b).99 The Illinois
Legislature has made quite clear, with a high level of specificity, its intentions regarding the liability of local government agencies.100

2.

The Snow Removal Act

The Illinois General Assembly took the opposite point of view with
regard to private citizens when it passed the Snow and Ice Removal Act in
1979.101 This act was the legislature’s attempt to codify the public policy
reinforced by the previously mentioned string of cases,102 in which Illinois
courts refrained from assigning liability to private property owners who had
made an attempt to clear ice and snow from their property, even though
they had possibly done so negligently.103 By passing this act, Illinois lawmakers sought to encourage action (rather than inaction for fear of liability)
by private citizens when it came to snow and ice removal.104 It is clear that
95. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101 (1965).
96. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1-101.1(a) (1965) (“The purpose of this Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of
government.”). See also Catherine Voigt, The Death of the Special Duty Exception of Statutory Governmental Immunity, 86 ILL. B.J. 372, 372 (1998).
97. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3-105(a) (1965) (“Neither a local public entity nor a
public employee is liable for an injury caused by the effect of weather conditions . . . .”);
Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 453 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
98. 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3605/1 (1945).
99. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (1965) (“Nothing in this Act affects the liability,
if any, of a local public entity or public employee, based on . . . [o]peration as a common
carrier; and this Act does not apply to any entity organized under or subject to the ‘Metropolitan Transit Authority Act’, approved April 12, 1945, as amended . . . .”).
100. See Krywin v. Chi. Transit Auth., 938 N.E.2d 440, 451 (Ill. 2010) (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
101. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (1979); see Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 453 (Freeman, J.,
dissenting).
102. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
103. See Polelle, supra note 14, at 646.
104. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (1979).
It is declared to be the public policy of this State that owners and others
residing in residential units be encouraged to clean the sidewalks abut-
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the Illinois General Assembly had quite different intentions with regard to
liability for private landowners, as compared to common carriers like the
CTA.105

III. THE FACTS OF KRYWIN V. CHICAGO TRANSIT AUTHORITY
Marianna Krywin, a Chicago resident, was a seventy-six year old
Polish immigrant and a former nurse.106 Prior to the incident in question she
did not require any kind of artificial assistance with walking, such as a cane
or a walker.107 On January 13, 2005 she took the CTA red line “El” train to
the Sheridan Road Station.108 Upon exiting the train, Ms. Krywin lost her
footing and fell backwards.109 As a result she fractured the tibia and fibula
bones in her left leg, which required her to have surgery and spend nearly a
month in the hospital.110 The various other factors that were present on that
morning, such as the condition of the platform onto which Ms. Krywin
stepped when she exited the train, and the weather on that morning and the
relevant period leading up to it, were the subject of various witnesses’ conflicting testimonies.111
Anthony Morales was a rail maintenance worker for the CTA, whose
duties included the upkeep of several El platforms throughout the city, including the Sheridan Road Station.112 During the winter months, one of his
jobs was to remove any ice and snow on the platform and then to spread
sand across the entire platform.113 He did not remember if he was at the
Sheridan Station on January 13, but, based on his normal schedule and routine, he would have been there on that very morning.114 Mr. Morales also
testified that the station had a small canopy that covered less than half of
the platform.115

Id.

ting their residences of snow and ice. The General Assembly, therefore,
determines that it is undesirable for any person to be found liable for
damages due to his or her efforts in the removal of snow or ice from
such sidewalks, except for acts which amount to clear wrongdoing.

105.
101 (1965).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Compare 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (1979), with 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 444.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 443.
Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 442-45.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Patricia Majors was a college student at DePaul University, who frequently rode the red line train to and from work and school.116 On the morning of the incident she was waiting on the southbound platform of the Sheridan Station.117 She testified that it was rainy and cold that morning, and
that there was enough slush on the sidewalks that day to come up over the
top of her shoes.118 Also, there was a combination of ice and snow on the El
platform, and the layer of ice was about one-tenth of an inch thick.119 She
did not think that any work had been done by the CTA to the platform with
regard to the icy conditions.120 Ms. Majors witnessed Ms. Krywin exit the
train and immediately fall down.121 She remembered that it was actually
raining at the time because she and another person gave Ms. Krywin their
coats to shield her from the precipitation.122 Ms. Krywin was lying on a
mixture of snow and ice, and there was no sand or salt on the platform at
that time.123
Theresa Williams worked as a customer service agent for the CTA,
and she was assigned to the Sheridan Road Station on the date of the incident.124 She responded to the customer service bell to find that Ms. Krywin
had fallen and was complaining that she had hurt her ankle and that it was
possibly broken.125 Ms. Williams filled out two reports regarding the incident for the CTA, and she also later testified that the red line ran twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week in January 2005.126 The reports that
Ms. Williams submitted indicated that it was “foggy” and that there was
“sleet” on the date of the incident.127 Additionally, the area of the platform
where Ms. Krywin fell was characterized as “wet.”128
Ruben Bonner was the train operator on the day of the incident.129 He
testified via discovery deposition that after Ms. Krywin had fallen, he observed her on her hands and knees on the platform.130 There were eight cars
on his train that day, and she had exited from one of the cars toward the rear

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 443.
Id.
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 444.
Id. (quoting the CTA incident report prepared by Theresa Williams).
Id. at 444 (quoting the CTA incident report prepared by Theresa Williams).
Id.
Id.
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of the train.131 He testified that he did not remember if it was precipitating
at the time of the incident, but that it had snowed recently and that it was
cold, and “[t]he surface of the platform was wet and icy.”132 Despite these
conditions, Mr. Bonner did not testify that he issued any verbal warning
over the intercom to the passengers, or that it was the CTA’s policy to do so
under such conditions.133
The only testimony that the CTA offered when presenting its defense
was that of Diane Senechal.134 She was also at the Sheridan Road platform
at the time of the incident, but did not actually witness Ms. Krywin fall.135
She remembered that it was snowing at the time because she held her umbrella over Ms. Krywin to shield her from the precipitation, and that it had
been snowing or sleeting earlier that morning as well.136 There was some
ice and slush accumulated on that platform, but most of it had drained
through the slats on the floor.137 She also witnessed someone with a broom
on the platform, but they were not sweeping or spreading sand at the
time.138
Marianna Krywin filed two counts in her initial allegation against the
CTA.139 First, “that the CTA had a duty to exercise ordinary care in the
operation, supervision, and maintenance of the area of ingress and egress
where plaintiff fell and that the CTA negligently failed in its duty;”140
second, “that the CTA had a duty to exercise the highest degree of care in
the operation of its trains and in the maintenance of the train stations and
alleged that the CTA was guilty of willful and wanton conduct in failing to
fulfill that duty.”141
The CTA filed a motion for directed verdict after Ms. Krywin had presented her evidence on the grounds that she had not made a prima facie case
for either her negligence or willful and wonton misconduct claims.142 The
trial court granted the motion only in part, finding that the CTA did in fact
have a duty to provide Ms. Krywin with a safe place to alight.143 Whether
131. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 443.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 445.
135. Id.
136. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 445.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 442.
140. Id.
141. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 442.
142. Id. at 444 (“The motion alleged that, as a matter of law, the CTA had no duty to
remove a natural accumulation of ice and snow and no duty to warn of such an accumulation.”).
143. Id. at 445 (“[T]his duty existed regardless of the reason for the unsafe area.”).
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the CTA had fulfilled this duty or not was a question left for the jury.144
After deliberations the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Krywin, and
awarded her the amount of $372,141.145
The CTA appealed this verdict, arguing that the trial court erred when
it failed to grant the CTA’s motion for directed verdict in the entirety.146
The appellate court agreed with the CTA and reversed the trial court’s ruling.147 The appellate court determined that the duty of common carriers to
provide their passengers with a safe place to alight is overruled by the natural accumulation rule because “imposing a duty on the CTA to inspect
every platform every time a train was to discharge or take on passengers
would bring the transit system to a standstill.”148
Ms. Krywin made three arguments in her appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court.149 First, that a common carrier’s duties are not negated by the
natural accumulation rule; second, that the appellate court “impermissibly
expand[ed] the natural accumulation rule” by allowing it to negate the fact
finders’ determination that “the CTA could have fulfilled its duty to provide
a safe place to alight without engaging in ice removal;” third, that the CTA
is still guilty of willful and wonton misconduct despite the natural accumulation rule.150 The Illinois Supreme Court was not persuaded by any of Ms.
Krywin’s arguments, and affirmed the appellate court’s ruling “that the trial
court should have directed a verdict in favor of the CTA in its entirety.”151

IV. ANALYSIS
A.

REPORT

The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by reviewing the fundamentals of a negligence claim, and more specifically when a duty is
owed.152 Justice Garman, in delivering the opinion of the court, remained
faithful to Justice Cardozo’s philosophy first set forth in the famous Pal-

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 445. The CTA argued that they did not owe any duty to
Ms. Krywin “to remove the natural accumulation of ice and snow on the platform” and that
she had failed to prove that they did. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 446.
149. Id.
150. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 446.
151. Id. at 452.
152. Id. at 446-47.
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sgraf case153 by stressing the importance of examining the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant to determine what obligations arise
from it.154 According to Justice Garman, this inquiry involves a four-part
analysis of foreseeability, likelihood of injury, and the magnitude and consequence of placing the burden on the defendant to protect others from the
potential harm.155
The opinion quickly shifts gears however, turning the focus away from
duty and towards an in-depth examination of the natural accumulation
rule.156 It is fitting that so little time is spent on duty since the main point of
the opinion is to establish an exception from duty where one would normally be applied.

1.

The Majority Opinion

Justice Garman’s attempt to analogize and synthesize prior case law in
Illinois with Krywin begins with Mcelligot v. Illinois Central Railroad,157
which is a case also involving an unfortunate incident with a train.158 This
case did not involve a passenger on a train, but rather a motorist attempting
to stop at railroad crossing intersection.159 Due to slippery conditions on the
road caused by ice and snow, the plaintiff failed to break in time to avoid a
fatal collision with a speeding train.160 The court found in favor of the defendant train company stating that, although the railroad had a duty to
maintain the four-foot area surrounding the tracks constituting the train’s
right-of-way, it (just like the municipality on the rest of the street) could not
be held liable for natural accumulations of ice and snow just outside of that
area.161
The court next turned to cases which reinforced one of its main contentions in support of the natural accumulation rule: that holding common
153.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (“Negligence,
like risk, is thus a term of relation . . . bodily security is protected, not against all forms of
interference or aggression, but only against some.”).
154. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 447 (“The touchstone of the duty analysis is to ask
whether the plaintiff and defendant stood in such a relationship to one another that the law
imposes on the defendant an obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.”).
155. Id. (citing Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 856 N.E.2d 1048, 1057-58 (Ill.
2006)).
156. Id. at 447-48.
157.
227 N.E.2d 764 (Ill. 1967).
158. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 447-48.
159. Mcelligot, 227 N.E.2d at 765.
160. Id. at 766.
161. Id. at 770 (“[W]e hereby hold that the railroad has no greater duty than a municipality to remove or otherwise offset the effect of natural accumulations of snow and ice
from that part of its right of way not encompassed by its crossings and approaches . . . .”).
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carriers liable in situations similar to Krywin would set a precedent that
would impose so much of a burden on potential defendants that the services
they currently provide would no longer be viable.162 Justice Garman cited
decisions from the Illinois appellate courts that involved buses and elevators.163 These cases supported their verdicts for the defendants by using the
argument that holding otherwise would be so impractical and unrealistic
that these modern conveniences on which our society has grown to depend
would become cripplingly limited.164
The plaintiff’s response to this argument was that no undue burden existed in this case (and therefore there was no need to apply the natural accumulation rule to alleviate such a burden), because the snow and ice on the
platform had been there for several days and could have easily been removed.165 The majority turned to economic reasoning to refute this contention, stating that the “burden” did not refer to the effort required to remove
the ice and snow, or the difficulty of doing so, but rather the unreasonableness of requiring the municipality to pay for these services to be rendered.166 The court went on to add that the natural accumulation rule applies
whether or not it is currently precipitating and regardless of how long the
accumulation of ice and snow has existed.167
162. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 448-49.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Serritos v. Chi. Transit Auth., 505 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (“Requiring defendant's drivers to remedy a slushy condition on their steps which was
brought about by snow being tracked into their vehicles by patrons would bring the transit
system to a complete standstill.”)) (citing Shoemaker v. Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Med.
Ctr., 543 N.E.2d 1014, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (“Requiring building operators to carpet
lobbies and halls on each elevator stop would place a tremendous burden on them without
any assured results.”)) (citing Jones v. Chi. Transit Auth., 565 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990) (“It would be impractical to require the CTA to replace or retrofit each and every bus
so all of its vehicles were equipped with a drainage system to allow water to flow onto the
street.”)).
165. Id. at 449 (“[The plaintiff] argues the evidence showed that there was no ongoing storm in Chicago the day of plaintiff's accident, but that the ice on the platform had been
there continuously for three days and that nothing had been done to remedy the condition,
although the CTA could have easily done so.”).
166. Id. (“[T]he reason for the natural accumulation rule is that it would be unreasonable to require a city to expend funds and perform the labor necessary to keep its walks
reasonably free from ice and snow during the winter months.”).
167. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 449 (“We note that the general rule that property owners
have no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice or snow from their property has been
applied without regard to any ongoing precipitation . . . or the length of time the natural
accumulation has existed . . . .”) (citation omitted)) (citing Sheffer v. Springfield Airport
Auth., 632 N.E.2d 1069, 1070 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding for the defendant even though at
the time of the slip and fall the sun was out and the weather was clear)) (citing Frederick v.
Prof’l Truck Driver Training Sch., Inc., 765 N.E.2d 1143, 1149 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“[A]
natural accumulation of ice and snow does not ‘logically’ transform into an ‘unnatural’ one
simply by the passage of time.”)).
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Next the court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the CTA had
failed to provide her with a safe place to alight.168 To support her argument,
the plaintiff relied on the Illinois First Appellate District case of Wasserman
v. City of Chicago,169 in which a bus driver stopped alongside of a large
snow bank and a passenger was injured while attempting to exit.170 The
court in that case reversed a summary judgment in favor of the city stressing the heightened degree of care required by common carriers, which includes the duty to provide a safe place to alight.171 The court in Krywin
dismissed this argument stating that Wasserman was distinct from the case
at bar because a bus driver has much greater latitude to pick and choose a
spot to discharge passengers than does a train operator.172
The next argument that the plaintiff made with regard to the duty to
provide a safe place to alight was that the CTA did not present any evidence
that it was not feasible to allow passengers to disembark from the train at
the areas clear of ice and snow under the canopies at the El station.173 The
court refuted this argument, stating that the burden of proof for this matter
rested on the plaintiff and not the defendant,174 and that she had failed to
present any evidence to meet this burden.175
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 449-50.
547 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
Id. at 487.
Wasserman, 547 N.E.2d at 488.
It is well established that a common carrier must exercise the highest degree of care to its passengers, and the passenger-carrier relationship does
not terminate until the passenger has had a reasonable opportunity to
reach a place of safety. Thus, the duty imposed upon defendant required
that its driver provide plaintiff with a safe place to alight from the bus.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 450 (“In any event, it is obvious that a bus driver has a
much better opportunity to determine the best place to let his or her passengers off the bus
than does a train operator on an eight-car train whose only option is to discharge passengers
on a platform.”).
173. Id. at 450-51.
174. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 451 (citing Blue v. Envtl. Eng’g, Inc., 828 N.E.2d 1128,
1142 (Ill. 2005) (“The burden to prove all the elements of a negligence claim remains on the
plaintiff throughout the proceedings. It is not the defendant's burden to disprove negligence.”)).
175. Id.
Plaintiff presented no evidence that it was feasible or even possible to
discharge all passengers under the canopy or in some other manner that
would have provided passengers with a safe place to alight. Plaintiff
cannot escape her burden of proof on the issue of breach of duty by attempting to shift that burden onto the CTA. Contrary to plaintiff's contention, she did not prove that the CTA breached its duty to her to provide a safe place to alight.
Id.
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Next the majority addressed the plaintiff’s claim that the CTA was
guilty of willful and wanton misconduct because they knew about the icy
conditions on the platform for a minimum of two days before the incident
and did nothing to provide safe exit from their trains.176 The court held that
willful and wanton misconduct is simply an “aggravated form of negligence,”177 and not a “separate and independent tort.”178 Therefore, since the
plaintiff had failed to prove the necessary elements of her negligence claim,
she likewise could not support an argument for willful and wanton misconduct.179
Although the “open and obvious” dangers doctrine180 is only mentioned by name in the dissenting opinion,181 the majority seems to lay the
foundation for its holding on the concepts it presents. While admitting that
the conditions presented by snow and ice are dangerous, the fact that they
have long been known and acknowledged as an inevitable consequence of
our climate makes it unreasonable to impose a duty to remedy such conditions.182

2.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Freeman began his counterargument to the majority opinion by
examining the relevant legislation in Illinois.183 Specifically, he referred to
the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity
Act.184 This Act provides a shield against liability for most governmental
176. Id. at 451-52 (explaining that plaintiff relies on evidence that CTA had several
employees like Anthony Morales whose duties included spreading sand on the platforms,
and the testimony of Patricia Majors that the icy conditions had existed for at least two days,
and, at the time of the incident, there was no sand on the platform).
177. Id. at 452 (citing Sparks v. Starks, 856 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)).
178. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 452 (citing Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 641 N.E.2d 402,
405 (Ill. 1994)).
179. Id.
180. See supra note 74.
181. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 454 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 450 (quoting Trevino v. Flash Cab Co., 651 N.E. 2d 723, 728 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995)).
In so holding, we recognize the dangers posed by natural accumulations
of snow and ice. The absence of a duty to remove them “does not rest
upon the notion that the conditions presented by such accumulations are
safe. To the contrary, the hazards presented have always been acknowledged, but the imposition of an obligation to remedy those conditions
would be so unreasonable and impractical as to negate the imposition of
a legal duty to do so.”
Id.
183. Id. at 453.
184. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/2-101 (2008).
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agencies in Illinois.185 Justice Freeman pointed out, however, that although
the CTA does qualify as a governmental agency, it was intentionally excluded from the protection of the Act as evidenced by specific language
stating so.186 Therefore, the dissent argued that the majority’s holding is in
direct conflict with the clear intention of the legislature with regard to this
matter.187
Justice Freeman next turned his attention to the relevant case law in Illinois, which has set a precedent with regard to the application of the natural accumulation rule to common carriers.188 He began this analysis by discrediting the relevance of Mcelligot v. Illinois Central Railroad,189 which
was a case that the majority gave significant weight to in its opinion.190 He
effectively distinguished Mcelligot from Krywin by pointing out that the
plaintiff in that case was not a passenger on the train in question, but rather
a motorist.191 It is this status as a passenger which invokes the common
carrier’s heightened duty of care.192
The dissenting opinion next turned its attention to the “open and obvious” rule as outlined in Section 343 of the Second Restatement of
Torts.193 Although the Restatement is not governing law in Illinois, the
principles of Section 343 were effectively adopted into the state’s common
law precedent in the case of Ward v. K Mart Corporation.194 The significance of Ward when applied to Krywin is not its adoption of the “open and
obvious” rule itself, but rather the exception to the rule. This exception being that despite the obviousness of a dangerous condition, a landowner may
still be responsible for warning those invited onto his or her property of the
hazard.195 This line of reasoning undercuts the majority’s stance that it is
unreasonable to place the burden of snow and ice removal on landowners

185. See supra Part II.D.1.
186. See supra note 99.
187. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 453 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“The legislature's action
indicates its intent that the CTA not receive the benefit of the natural accumulation rule,
although other local governmental agencies do . . . . [Thus] [t]he General Assembly's action
therefore forecloses the court's holding today.”).
188. Id. at 453-54.
189. 227 N.E.2d 764.
190. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 447-48.
191. Id. at 454 n.1 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“This is somewhat misleading in that
the plaintiff's decedent in that case was not the carrier's passenger. Rather, he was driving a
car which slid on a street which belonged to the carrier as part of its right of way.”).
192. Id. (citing Katamay, 289 N.E.2d at 625-26 (“[T]hat status of being a passenger
triggers the common carrier's duty to the highest degree of care for the safety of an individual.”)).
193. Id. at 454-56.
194. See id. at 454-55.
195. See supra note 83.
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because the dangers of such conditions should be obvious to those accustomed to the winter climate in Illinois.196
According to Justice Freeman, Ward set the precedent in Illinois that
to comply with the duty of reasonable care afforded to business invitees,
business owners must be mindful of those who may not recognize an open
and obvious danger or be unable to avoid the consequences of encountering
it.197 This does not mean, however, that all landowners will automatically
be completely liable for injuries occurring on their property.198 According
to Ward, whether or not a condition was sufficiently obvious as to not require a warning is a question for the trier of fact.199 Additionally, a plaintiff
may be found to be contributorily negligent, alleviating the defendant of
full responsibility.200
According to Justice Freeman, the advantages of the Illinois Supreme
Court adhering to the previous precedent it set in Ward rather than effectively abolishing it (as the majority opinion in Krywin does) are twofold.201
First, those who own and occupy land are best situated to provide protection to those who will be routinely entering the premises,202 and second, the
precedent “encourage[s] landowners to repair defects, rather than to keep
them ‘open and obvious’ in order to avoid liability under the [the majority’s] approach.”203
The dissenting opinion then went on to cite cases in jurisdictions with
similar (or worse) winter weather conditions to Illinois that take the Restatement’s view, as opposed to the pro-natural-accumulation-rule stance
taken by the majority.204 The first of these is Kremer v. Carr’s Food Center,
Inc., which comes from the snowy state of Alaska.205 The case involved a

196. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
197. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 454-55 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“In the wake of Ward a
business owner's duty of reasonable care for conditions on its premises extends to those
whom it should expect will not realize the danger or will fail to protect themselves against
it.”).
198. See Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 233-34 (Ill. 1990).
199. Id. at 234 (“Whether in fact the condition itself served as adequate notice of its
presence or whether additional precautions were required to satisfy the defendant's duty are
questions properly left to the trier of fact.”).
200. Id. (“The trier of fact may also consider whether the plaintiff was in fact guilty
of negligence contributing in whole or in part to his injury, and adjust the verdict accordingly.”).
201. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 455 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (“[O]ccupiers of premises are generally in a better position in modern society to protect the public from hazards than are invitees who must go into public places as part
of daily life.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 455-56.
205.
462 P.2d 747 (Alaska 1969).

2011]

UNNATURALLY STUBBORN

637

customer who slipped and fell on an icy patch in a store parking lot.206 Despite undoubtedly having more extreme, and most certainly more dangerous, winter weather conditions than Illinois, the Alaska Supreme Court remained true to similar ideas adopted by the Ward court from Section 343 of
the Restatement, rather than invoking the protection of the natural accumulation rule.207 Although it is arguably the most qualified state in the union to
do so, Justice Freeman points out that the Alaska Supreme Court refused to
use inclement weather as an excuse.208
Additionally, Justice Freeman cited cases from two other cold-weather
states (Michigan and Maine) that, similar to Alaska, prefer the policy of the
Restatement over that of the natural accumulation rule.209 In Quinlivan v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., the Supreme Court of Michigan “reject[ed] the prominently cited notion that ice and snow hazards are obvious
to all and therefore may not give rise to liability.”210 Also, in Isaacson v.
Husson College, the Maine Supreme Court took a similar view.211
Next, Justice Freeman took a different angle in his argument to refute
the majority opinion’s reasoning of an undue burden.212 Three lines of reasoning were given which make the assertion that the burden on the CTA
206.
207.

Id.

Id. at 748.
Id. at 749-50.
Section 343 is controlling here. A jury could have found: (a) that Carr's
possessed the parking lot and knew the condition of its surface, (b) that
Carr's should have realized that this condition involved an unreasonable
risk of harm to its business invitees, (c) that Carr's should have expected
that its business invitees would not discover or realize the danger, or
should have anticipated that they would fail to protect themselves
against a danger they did discover or realize, or should otherwise have
anticipated harm to invitees despite the fact that the danger was known
or obvious to them, and (d) that Carr's failed to exercise reasonable care
to protect business invitees, such as Kremer, from the dangerous surface
conditions in its parking lot.

208. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 456 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“The court noted that the
‘mere fact’ that ‘snow and ice conditions prevail for many months throughout various locations in Alaska’ was not ‘in and of itself sufficient rationale for the insulation of the possessor of land from liability to his business invitee.’”) (quoting Kremer, 462 P.2d at 752).
209. Id.
210.
235 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Mich. 1975).
211.
297 A.2d 98, 106-07 (Me. 1972)
But the defendant asserts, as a bar to recovery as a matter of law, plaintiff's own negligence or fault in encountering an obvious danger . . . .
Mere knowledge of an icy condition before passing over it does not establish negligence on the part of a business invitee. The test is, whether
the plaintiff, knowing of the icy condition, reasonably believed, or had a
right to believe, that he could use the pathway safely by the exercise of
reasonable care.
212. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 456 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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would actually be quite low, especially when compared in proportion to the
high risk of potential severe injuries that passengers face. 213 First, the CTA
already has employees in place, like Anthony Morales, whose duties include checking on the safety of the platforms.214 Second, applying the reasoning from Ward,215 a simple warning such as an announcement from the
conductor or an easily visible sign could be seen by a fact finder to have
fulfilled the duty owed by the CTA, instead of undertaking the overwhelming burden of clearing all of the ice and snow from every El platform in
Chicago.216 Finally, the CTA would not be held strictly liable every time
someone slipped and fell, the partial defense of comparative liability could
be used to assign fault proportionally.217
Finally, the dissent made one more argument citing previous precedent
set by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Marshall v. Burger King
Corporation.218 The case involved an injury sustained by the plaintiff when
an automobile crashed through the wall of a Burger King restaurant.219 The
Court decided that it was a question for the jury to decide if the defendant,
as a business invitor, had breached its duty of care to the plaintiff, as a
business invitee, by not taking precautions to guard against this type of accident.220
A.

ANALYSIS

1.

Why the Majority Opinion is Wrong

The majority opinion is wrong in this case first because it ignores the
specific intentions of the legislature.221 The Illinois General Assembly
spelled out in no uncertain terms that it did not wish for the Tort Immunity
Act to apply to organizations such as the CTA,222 and that the protection
provided by the Snow Removal Act was intended for private citizens.223 As
Justice Freeman points out in his dissent, the court in Krywin is making its
own public policy, which is a responsibility that on previous occasions it
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See supra notes 198-200.
216. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 456 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
217. Id.
218.
856 N.E.2d 1048
219. Id. at 1051.
220. Id. at 1054 (“[W]hether a defendant breached the duty and whether the breach
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries are factual matters for the jury to decide,
provided there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding those issues.”).
221. See supra note 187.
222. Id.
223. See supra Part II.D.2.
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has deferred to the legislature.224 Justice Freeman also makes the argument
that the reason the CTA was left out of this legislation is because often citizens are encouraged by government officials to use public transportation
during dangerous weather conditions instead of attempting to drive themselves.225 The decision in Krywin directly undermines this intention because
now if people follow the safety advice of public officials by staying off of
the roads, they will have no recourse if they are injured by natural accumulations of ice and snow while using public transportation.226 Not only is it,
by its own admission, not the place of the Illinois Supreme Court to make
such policy decisions, the result of the decision is contradictory and counterproductive.
Additionally, the majority opinion in this case is wrong because it misuses or misinterprets prior precedent set by Illinois courts with regard to
the matter at issue. First of all, the majority’s reliance on Mcelligot is completely misguided considering that the relationship between the plaintiff and
the common carrier in that case is completely different than in Krywin.227
Tort law precedent, and both the majority and minority opinions, makes it
abundantly clear that the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is
key in determining liability.228 Secondly, the cases that the majority
presents to support its argument that abolishing the natural accumulation
rule would create an overwhelming burden on public transportation229 are
effectively countered by the arguments made by the dissent which presents
scenarios that would not be over-burdensome at all, especially compared
with the seriousness of the potential injuries at risk.230 Additionally, the
majority’s reliance on the concepts of the “open and obvious” doctrine231
are refuted by Section 343A of the Restatement,232 and precedent set by
courts in other jurisdictions with similar winter weather which give no credence to the idea that just because people are used to ice and snow they
224. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 457 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing Boub v. Twp. of
Wayne, 702 N.E.2d 535, 542-43 (Ill. 1998) (“By its actions today, the court has indicated
that it can better form the public policy of this state than can the General Assembly, even
though this court regularly states that it is the General Assembly that is the branch of government uniquely suited for that role.”)).
225. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 457 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
226. Id. (“Today's decision ignores the protection that the General Assembly has
seen fit to give the users of the CTA and puts those citizens who follow officials' directions
in potential harm's way with no recourse for the damages they might incur if injured on an
icy CTA platform.”).
227. See supra notes 191-92.
228. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 162-64.
230. See supra notes 212-17.
231. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
232. See supra Part II.C.2.
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should be responsible if they hurt themselves on it.233 Finally, the majority
ignores its own precedent set in Marshall, regarding duties owed to business invitees.234 Justice Freeman puts it quite eloquently in his dissent by
stating that “[i]f Burger King has a duty to protect its diners from an airborne car, then the CTA should also have a duty protect its passengers from
icy conditions on its train platforms.”235
Finally, the majority opinion is wrong because it offers no recourse for
persons who suffer painful, debilitating, and expensive injuries through no
fault of their own. If the holding in Krywin continues to be good law, then
people in similar situations to our hypothetical “Paul Passenger” will simply be told that they are out of luck even though because of happenstance,
misfortune, and most importantly negligence they have suffered a crushing
blow to both their physical and financial well-being. The future of tort litigation in Illinois, whenever a common carrier is involved looks quite grim
as long as the holding in Krywin is still good law.
2.

Why the Dissenting Opinion is Right

Not only is Justice Freeman’s dissenting opinion correct because it effectively refutes every argument presented by the majority,236 but also because it offers an alternative that is a flexible compromise which is in stark
contrast with the majority’s black and white, zero liability stance. The philosophy offered by the dissent draws from Section 343 of the Restatement
and Ward only requires that a common carrier take precautions toward
“those whom it should expect will not realize [a] danger or will fail to protect themselves against it.”237 Elderly people like Ms. Krywin who depend
on public transportation for their livelihood are the perfect example of those
whom the CTA should anticipate will require additional measures and
whom the dissenting opinion takes into account. Furthermore, the remedies
that Justice Freeman suggests are not an overwhelming burden,238 and
would take quite a stretch of the imagination to envision them “bring[ing]
the transportation system to a standstill.”239 Finally, the comparative fault
doctrine mentioned by the dissent would ensure that the CTA would not be

233. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 220.
235. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 457 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (citing J. Powell, Marshall
v. Burger King Corp.: Making a Mess of “Duty” For Businesses in Illinois, 28 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 95, 95 n.1 (2007)).
236. See supra Part IV.A.2.
237. Krywin, 938 N.E.2d at 454-55 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
238. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 164.
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overwhelmed by a flood of meritless cases involving everyone who slipped
and fell while using public transportation.240
Justice Freeman’s dissent in Krywin both gives proper weight to the
authority of the legislature and of prior precedent, while offering a realistic
and fair solution to the problem presented that is not without support both
in the law and in the real world.

V. CONCLUSION
The precedent set by the Illinois Supreme Court in Krywin v. Chicago
Transit Authority is one which should be overturned. First, because of its
divergence from common law precedent set both by Illinois courts and other courts throughout the nation that have dealt with similar issues. Second,
because of its reliance on the “known or obvious dangers” doctrine as a
means of justifying its holding, and the direct conflict this presents with
established policies in Illinois. Third, because of its inconsistency with the
statutory language and the legislative intent behind Illinois’ Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act and other Illinois
laws. Finally, because the concerns created for future accident victims in
Illinois with no recourse or remedy are not justified by the reasoning offered in Krywin. As a result of Krywin, these concerns will now be ignored.
THEODORE RICHGELS

240. See supra notes 85-86.
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